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World War II Inflation, September 1939-August 1948
THE OUTBREAK of war in Europe in September 1939 ushered in a period
of inflation comparable to the inflations which accompanied the Civil War
and World War I, though more protracted than either. By the postwar
price peak nine years later (August 1948), wholesale prices had more
than doubled, the implicit price deflator had somewhat less than doubled,
the stock of money had nearly tripled, and money income had multiplied
more than two-and-a-half-fold (see Chart 45). As this comparison indi-
cates, velocity on net fell over the period. After an initial rise to 1942,
it fell sharply to 1946 and then rose mildly to 1948. According to annual
data, wholesale prices rose at the average rate of 8.2 per cent per
year; the implicit price deflator, 6.5 per cent per year; the stock of
money, 12.3 per cent per year; money income, 10.7 per cent per year;
real income, 4.2 per cent per year; and velocity fell at the average rate
of 1.7 per cent per year.
1 Substantial though these rates of change are,
the rate of rise in the money stock was slightly lower than in World War
I and about half the rate in the Civil War; the rate of rise in prices
was less than three-fifths the rate in World War I and only one-third that
in the Civil War.
2
As in World War I, wholesale prices jumped on the outbreak of
war, then stayed roughly constant for about a year before resuming their
1 Paralleling World War I figures, our income figures for 1942-45 are modifica-
tions of Kuznets' estimates on the basis of Kendrick's "national security version"
of net national product (see Chap. 5, footnote 16).
2 For prices and money stock, the comparison between the three wars is as
follows:
World War II World War I Civil War
Start of war Sept. 1939-" Julyl914-
b April 1861-
Pricepeak Aug. 1948 May 1920 Jan. 1865
RATE OF RISE, PER CENT PER YEAR
Money stock 12.1 12.9 24.0
c
Wholesale prices 8.7 15.3 24.5
tt Measured from Aug. 1939, see Table 23.
b Measured from June 1914, see Table 16.
"From June 1861 through fiscal year ending June 1865. Data for those years are
from Milton Friedman, "Price, Income, and Monetary Changes in Three Wartime
Periods," American Economic Review, May 1952, p. 624.
These figures for World War II differ from those given in the text, because
they are derived from monthly rather than annual data.130 WORLD WAR II INFLATION
CHART 45
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upward movement. As in World War I also, prices rose more rapidly
before and after involvement than during the United States' active par-
ticipation in the war, at least as judged from the available indexes. Again
as in World War I, the sources of the rise in the stock of money were
quite different in the three periods just distinguished: the period of U.S.
neutrality, the period of our active participation in the war, and the
postwar period. Table 23 records the changes in prices and the stock of
money during those periods and the factors accounting for the changes
in the stock of money.
1. U.S. Neutrality, September 1939-November 1941
Politically, the period of U.S. neutrality was clearly demarcated. Economi-
cally, it was not. During its early months—the so-called "phony war" pe-
riod—the war had little impact on the U.S. economy. After a brief specula-
tive movement in the final quarter of 1939, production, employment, and
personal income in general declined until May 1940. The Nazi attack on
the Low Countries and the subsequent fall of France brought a dramatic
reversal. Britain and her remaining allies started placing large-scale orders
for war material in the United States. As we saw earlier, there was a sharp
increase in mid-1940 in the rate of flow of gold to the United States,
as gold was shipped to pay for war material. The United States simul-
taneously embarked on a greatly expanded defense program. Those de-
velopments spurred a rapid expansion in industrial production, employ-
ment, and personal income. Because of the large absolute amount of un-
employment and unused industrial capacity, wholesale prices at first re-
mained stable, starting to rise only in the fall of 1940. Economically, there-
fore, the beginning of the war for the United States as a neutral might
better be dated in the month when its effects first began to be felt—say,
May 1940.
To mark the close of that phase and the active involvement of the
United States in the war, the month when lend-lease began, March 1941,
is probably a better date than early December when war was declared
against Germany and Japan. Before lend-lease, Britain paid for war
purchases by transferring over $2 billion in gold, drawing down British
dollar balances by $235 million, and selling $335 million in U.S. securities
—the last two requisitioned in large part by the British government from
British subjects.
3 Thereafter, the U.S. government paid for much of the
war material, nominally in return for services rendered in exchange to
the United States. Lend-lease, under which some $50 billion was spent
by the end of the war, was the counterpart in World War II of U.S.
8 See International Transactions of the United States During the War, 1940-
1945, Economic Series No. 65, Office of Business Economics, Dept. of Commerce,
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loans to its allies in World War I. Within a month after the enactment
of lend-lease, the rapid rise in the gold stock that began in 1938 and
accelerated after the fall of France came to an end.
Whichever pair of dates is used—whether August 1939, just before
the outbreak of war in Europe, through November 1941, just before Pearl
Harbor (the dates used in Table .23) or those just suggested of May
1940 through March 1941—the growth of the money stock during the
period of U.S. neutrality was attributable entirely to the concomitant
growth of the gold stock (see Table 23, lines 7 and 11, for the first pair
of dates). The gold stock played the same role between those dates as it
did during the period of neutrality in World War I, when about 80
per cent of the increase in the stock of money was attributable to the in-
crease in the gold stock. During the neutrality period in World War II,
the stock of money grew by 29 per cent, high-powered money by the
same percentage, and the increase in high-powered money was less
than in the gold stock, the difference being absorbed by a decline in the
sum of Federal Reserve Bank private claims and the fiat of the monetary
authorities.
A rise in the ratio of commercial bank deposits to reserves, as banks
reduced their excess reserves, tended to increase the money stock but was
about offset by a concomitant decline in the ratio of deposits to currency
(Chart 46 and Table 23). These deposit ratios were to continue to move
in opposite directions throughout the war, just as they had during most of
World War I.
In the World War I neutrality period, the Federal Reserve System
had been powerless to offset the effects of the gold inflow, since it
possessed no earning assets to sell. In the World War II period, the
Federal Reserve was in a much stronger technical position. It had a port-
folio of over $2 billion of government securities which it could have
sold at will. True, even the sale of its whole portfolio would have offset
less than half the gold inflow from August 1939 to November 1941. How-
ever, the Treasury could have offset the rest—or indeed the whole or
more than the whole—of the gold inflow by sterilization operations like
those it had conducted in late 1936 and early 1937, when it sold securities
and used the proceeds to pay for gold rather than printing gold certifi-
cates to do so. Between them, therefore, the Treasury and the Federal
Reserve were technically in a position to control the changes in high-
powered money (see Chart 47 for the breakdown of high-powered
money, by assets and liabilities of the monetary authorities).
The behavior of prices gave reason to be concerned with the growth of
the money stock. From August 1939 to November 1941, wholesale prices
rose 23 per cent, or at the rate of 9 per cent per year and, as we have seen,
nearly the whole of the increase occurred in the final fifteen months ofWORLD WAR II INFLATION 135
CHART 46
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NOTE: Shaded areas represent business contractions; unshaded areas, business expansions.
SOURCE: Tables A-1 (col. 8) and B-3.
the period, when wholesale prices rose nearly 20 per cent and the stock of
money over 16 per cent. Yet, as is clear from Chart 49, below, the
Federal Reserve engaged in no extensive open market operations. In the
three weeks after the outbreak of war in September 1939, it purchased
some $400 million of government securities to offset a sharp drop in the
prices of U.S. government bonds.
4 These were sold off in the next few
* These operations were regarded by the Board as a departure from past practice,136 WORLD WAR II INFLATION
months so that, by the turn of the year, the System's holdings of govern-
ment securities were at their prewar level. Further sales of about $300
million were made from June to December 1940; thereafter, the System's
holdings of government securities were kept rigid until the United States
entered the war. The System thus largely continued the policy with re-
spect to open market operations and gold inflows that it had followed
since 1933.
During the period of neutrality, the Treasury, like the Reserve System,
undertook no operations to offset the gold inflow. Its weekly balances in
cash and Federal Reserve deposits fluctuated considerably, from a mini-
mum of about $2.4 billion to a maximum of about $3.4 billion. The
billion-dollar range was nearly half again as wide as the range in Federal
Reserve credit outstanding, so that Treasury operations were a more im-
portant factor affecting the money stock than Federal Reserve open
market operations. But the fluctuations in Treasury balances were not
undertaken for reasons of monetary policy and show no systematic con-
nection with monetary factors. They were simply a largely unintended re-
sult of fluctuations in expenditures and tax receipts and of the flotation
and retirement of securities.
In response to the rapid rise in prices and the stock of money, the
Federal Reserve took two actions in addition to the open market sales in
the latter half of 1940. Both were taken near the end of the period of
neutrality and both, in line with the general policy of the thirties, in-
volved use of new instruments of control.
On September 1, 1941, under authority of the President's executive
order of August 9, 1941, the Board imposed controls on consumer credit,
prescribing in Regulation W minimum down payments and maximum
maturities applicable to consumer credit extended through instalment
sales of certain listed articles. Because consumer durable goods shortly
since their object was not to affect the volume of member bank reserves and in-
debtedness. The operations were justified on two grounds: (1) their influence
directly on the prices and yields of government obligations and indirectly on the
prices and yields of corporate bonds, and hence on general economic recovery; (2)
the importance of safeguarding the enlarged member bank portfolio of government
securities from "unnecessarily wide and violent fluctuations in price" (Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, 1939, pp. 5-6). The first
reference to maintaining "orderly market conditions" was made in the Annual
Report, 1937, pp. 6-7, concerning Federal Reserve purchases in Apr. 1937, though,
as pointed out in Chap. 9, concern with maintaining an "orderly market" dated
from not later than 1935. Two important differences between the early enuncia-
tion of the policy of maintaining an orderly market for government securities and
its later wartime character are evident: (1) in 1939, the professed aims were to
protect member bank portfolios, not Treasury interests as a borrower, and to
assure an orderly capital market as a condition of general economic recovery; (2)
in 1939, a rigid system of support prices was not yet contemplated, but only the
degree of support that would prevent wide fluctuations in the prices of govern-
ment securities.WORLD WAR II INFLATION 137
CHART 47
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NOTE: Federal Reserve notes and Treasury currency are outside the Treasury and Federal
Reserve Banks. Between $40 million and $65 million of gold certificates recalled but not turned in
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became unavailable for the duration of the war, the volume of consumer
credit fell rapidly after Pearl Harbor. Consumer credit control was, in
consequence, of little significance during the war. It is worth note, first,
because it represented an extension to a new area of the principle, ini-
tially applied to security loans, of controlling specific types of credit,
and second, because it was destined to play a somewhat more important
role after the war.WORLD WAR n INFLATION 139
The Board's other measure was to raise reserve requirements on No-
vember 1, 1941, to the maximum limit permitted by law, thereby re-
scinding the reduction made in April 1938. That measure converted $1.2
billion of the then extant $4.7 billion of excess reserves into required
reserves.
5 A sign of the changed attitudes of banks is that they made no
attempt to rebuild their excess reserves, as they had after the reserve in-
creases of 1936 and 1937, but rather proceeded to continue to reduce
their remaining excess reserves. The effect of the reserve requirement
increase shows up only in a slackened rate of rise of the deposit-reserve
ratio from October—immediately following the announcement on Sep-
tember 23 of the forthcoming rise—to roughly April 1942, when the Fed-
eral Reserve announced that it would peg the rate on Treasury bills. The
ratio then started to rise at an even faster rate than before the reserve re-
quirement increase. It is ironic that the increase, presumably intended to
"tighten" monetary conditions and to restrain the expansion of bank lia-
bilities, did so only to a minor extent, whereas the earlier increase, intended
as a precautionary move and designed to have no immediate impact, had
exercised a sharp restraining influence.
2. Period of Wartime Deficits, December 1941-January 1946
The expanded defense program initiated in 1940 and lend-lease initiated
in early 1941 produced a substantial increase in government expenditures.
These were offset for a time by a rise in tax rates and tax revenues. By
early 1941, however, the deficit had begun to rise sharply. For calendar
1941, cash operating outgo exceeded cash operating income by $10 billion
or nearly half of total expenditures.
6 Pearl Harbor brought a sharp
intensification of these tendencies. Government expenditures nearly tripled
from calendar 1941 to calendar 1942, and rose a further 50 per cent
from 1942 to 1943, reaching a peak of nearly $95 billion in 1944. Tax re-
* Concern over the volume of excess reserves was expressed in a special report to
the Congress dated Dec. 31, 1940, made jointly by the Board of Governors, the
presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks, and the Federal Advisory Council
(Federal Reserve Bulletin, Jan. 1941, pp. 1-2). Among other points in the pro-
gram it presented, the report requested the Congress to increase the minimum
statutory reserve requirements to the maximum defined in the Banking Act of
1935 and to permit the Federal Open Market Committee (not the Board of
Governors) to increase requirements to double the new minimum.
The reader is reminded that, for the period after 1940, we have not had access
to internal documents of the Federal Reserve System like those in the Harrison
Papers, or to an insider's running account like the Hamlin Diary. Hence, our dis-
cussion of Federal Reserve policy is less informed in detail than for earlier years
and it is not as well documented. The Reserve System could perform a service
to students of the period by making such documents available.
' The cash deficit or surplus differs from the budget deficit or surplus in con-
solidating the accounts of the social security and other trust funds with those of
other government agencies. It therefore gives a more satisfactory index for our
purposes of the impact of government operations on the rest of the economy.140 WORLD WAR II INFLATION
ceipts also rose but more slowly and in no greater ratio. As a result, the
cash deficit rose to levels without precedent, either in absolute amount
or as a percentage of national income: to nearly $40 billion in calendar
1942, over $50 billion in 1943, over $45 billion in 1944, and over $35
billion in 1945—sums averaging nearly 30 per cent of the contemporary
net national product. Government expenditures fell rapidly after the end
of hostilities while tax revenues remained high. As in World War I,
within six months after the end of the war the government was taking in
more than it was paying out, so that the period of wartime deficits came
to an end about January 1946.
As in World War I, those changes involved a continuation and inten-
sification of trends already in process. The transfer of economic resources
from peace to war production had been going on apace since early 1940.
On the physical side, intensification of trends was undoubtedly much
sharper in World War II than in World War I. The period of neutrality
was longer in World War I than in World War II and that of active hos-
tilities shorter; and World War II saw a far more complete conversion to
a "total war" economy than World War I did. On the financial side, the
situation was reversed. Thanks to lend-lease, active war meant less of a
change in the source of finance for war activity in World War II than it
had in World War I.
PRICE MOVEMENTS
As in World War I, also, our entry into active war was rather sur-
prisingly accompanied by a slowing down of the rate of rise in the
available price indexes, while the termination of wartime deficits was
accompanied by a sharp speeding up. As Table 23 shows, the wholesale
price index rose at the rate of 4 per cent a year during the period of war-
time deficits, compared with 9 per cent in the prior period and 16 per
cent in the succeeding period. These figures are less reliable indicators
of the behavior of prices in World War II than the corresponding figures
are for World War I. General price control was instituted in early 1942
and suspended in mid-1946. During the period of price control, there was
a strong tendency for price increases to take a concealed form, such as a
change in quality or in the services rendered along with the sale of a com-
modity or the elimination of discounts on sales or the concentration of
production on lines that happened to have relatively favorable price ceil-
ings. Moreover, where price control was effective, "shortages" developed,
in some cases—such as gasoline, meats, and a few other foods—ac-
companied by explicit government rationing. The resulting pressure on
consumers to substitute less desirable but available qualities and items
for more desirable but unavailable qualities and items was equivalent
to a price increase not recorded in the indexes. Finally, there was un-WORLD WAR II INFLATION 141
doubtedly much legal avoidance and illegal evasion of the price controls
through a variety of devices of which the explicit "black market" was
perhaps the least important. The result was that "prices," in any eco-
nomically meaningful sense, rose by decidedly more than the "price in-
dex" during the period of price control. The jump in the price index on
the elimination of price control in 1946 did not involve any corresponding
jump in "prices"; rather, it reflected largely the unveiling of price in-
creases that had occurred earlier. Allowance for the defects in the price
index as a measure of price change would undoubtedly yield a decidedly
higher rate of price rise during the war and a decidedly lower rate after
the war than those recorded in Table 23, and hence a substantially
smaller difference between the rate of price rise during the war and before
and after. It seems unlikely, however, that allowance for these defects
would reverse the qualitative conclusion that prices rose more slowly
during the war than before or after.
In World War I, differences in the rate of price change were accom-
panied by corresponding differences in the rate of change of the stock of
money: the stock of money also rose less rapidly during the war than be-
fore or after. In World War II, the reverse occurred: the stock of money
rose much more rapidly during the war than before or after. This is the
counterpart of the decline in velocity, 1942-46, and its subsequent rise—
just the opposite of the behavior of velocity in 1917-18 and after.
BEHAVIOR OF VELOCITY
It is by no means clear what factors explain the behavior of velocity in
World War II. Velocity rose by a fifth from 1940 to 1942—or slightly less
than from 1915 to 1918—then declined by over a third to 1946. From
1946 to 1948 it rose by 13 per cent, to a level still much lower than in
1939 (see Chart 45). Quarterly data on national income and monthly data
on personal income suggest that velocity reached its peak in the fourth
quarter of 1942 and its trough in the final quarter of 1945 or the first
quarter of 1946.
The initial rise in velocity is not surprising. Velocity, as measured,
generally rises during economic expansions and falls during economic con-
tractions. The expansion from 1940 to 1942 was vigorous and after mid-
1940 was accompanied by sharp price increases which might be expected
to discourage the holding of assets in the form of money.
What needs explanation is the decline in velocity after 1942. Price
control inhibited increases in prices after early 1942 and kept many in-
creases that did occur from showing up in the price index. It might be
argued that the cessation of the rise in the index removed the incentive,
provided by the prior price increase, to economize on the holding of
money. But even if it were granted that the price index properly recorded142 WORLD WAR II INFLATION
the price movements that determined the amount of money balances the
community desired to hold relative to its income, the cessation of the price
rise could hardly account for more than a return of velocity to, say, the
1940 level. It could not account for the fall of velocity well below that
level. Even to regard it as responsible for reducing velocity to the
1940 level would grossly overestimate its effect, since that would assume
full adjustment of velocity to the prior rate of rise of prices, whereas the
evidence of earlier chapters suggests that the adjustment of velocity to
changes in the rate of change in prices is slow and tardy.
It seems likely that any direct effect of price control was less im-
portant than the unavailability to consumers of automobiles and other
consumer durable goods, after wartime cessation of their production in
1942,
7 and than the restrictions imposed on construction and on private
capital formation. Both consumers and business enterprises were pre-
vented from using their funds to purchase kinds of goods they regard
as increasing their wealth, which ordinarily absorb a large fraction of in-
creases in income and an especially large fraction of transitory increases.
The blocking of these channels of spending induced consumers and busi-
ness enterprises to increase the stock of other assets—in particular, as it
turned out, money and government securities—to a much higher level
than otherwise, relative to income.
The counterpart on income account of the accumulation of liquid assets
was an unprecedentedly high level of personal saving. Personal saving
would have been large in any event because of the abnormally high level
of income associated with full employment and the war boom. But saving
was much larger than can readily be accounted for by income alone. One
important reason is that consumers accumulated in the form of liquid
assets funds that they would otherwise have spent or have tried to spend
on automobiles, other durable goods, and residential construction. The re-
current bond campaigns with their appeal to patriotism may have con-
tributed also to the high rate of saving, but we are inclined to be skeptical
that they had much effect on the amount of saving. If they had any ef-
fect, it was probably on the form in which savings were held—more in
government securities relative to other assets. Insofar as one of the
alternatives was money, the bond campaigns tended to make the decline
in velocity less than it otherwise would have been.
8
'Limitation (L-) orders were first issued in the summer of 1941 by the Supply,
Priority, and Allocations Board, a predecessor of the War Production Board, re-
stricting the output of finished products and eventually prohibiting production for
civilian use of automobiles, trucks, refrigerators, washing machines, electric ap-
pliances, etc. Prohibition of nonmilitary automobile production took effect Feb. 1,
1942, and of many other consumer durables by Sept. 1942.
* To avoid misunderstanding, it should perhaps be noted that the statements in
the text are not intended to be a full analysis of the factors accounting for the high
level of wartime savings. Numerous other factors doubtless played a role. See "AWORLD WAR II INFLATION 143
Both money and government securities, of course, were fixed in value in
nominal terms and so would have been poor forms in which to hold wealth
if their holders had expected them to depreciate sharply in their command
over real goods. Two points are relevant in this connection. First, the
assets were being held to exercise command at a later time over par-
ticular kinds of goods—on the interpretation suggested above, especially
over durable goods not currently available. It was entirely reasonable for
the public to expect the prices of these goods to decline—in a formal
sense, they had to, since their current prices were effectively infinite. And
that expectation was reinforced by the sharp rise in the price of second-
hand items of this kind. With respect to these goods, money holdings could
be expected to be worth more after the war. Second, almost certainly the
most widely-held expectation at the time was that prices would go
down after the war—if this expectation seems unreasonable to us,
it is only by hindsight. Memory of the sharp price decline after World
War I was reinforced by the climate of opinion formed by the depressed
1930's and both were further strengthened by much-publicized predic-
tions of "experts" that war's end would be followed by a major economic
collapse.
These expectations about the postwar period were important not only
because of their implications for the form in which savings were held but
also because expectations of great instability in the near future enhanced
the importance attached to accumulating money and other liquid assets.
The expected price change meant that those assets would yield more than
they would otherwise; the expected instability, that they were more de-
sirable for any given yield. Both, therefore, worked in the direction of re-
ducing velocity and hence also the price rise associated with any given in-
crease in the stock of money. (See Chapter 12 for a fuller analysis of
velocity and of the role of expectations about the degree of future eco-
nomic instability.)
World War I differed markedly from World War II with respect to
both the availability of goods and expectations about the postwar be-
havior of prices and income. "Shortages" and "controls" in World War I
were nowhere nearly so sweeping as in World War II, and no major
branch of civilian production suspended output entirely. World War I
came after nearly two decades of generally rising prices, when the climate
of opinion was characterized by belief in unlimited future potentialities
rather than by fear of secular stagnation.
Once the war was over in 1945 and durable goods gradually became
National Survey of Liquid Assets Distribution According to Income," Federal
Reserve Bulletin, July 1946, pp. 716-722; Michael Sapir, "Review of Economic
Forecasts for the Transition Period," Studies in Income and Wealth, Vol. 11,
New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1949, pp. 312-314; Lenore A.
Epstein, "Consumers' Taxable Assets," ibid., Vol. 12, 1950, pp. 440-453.144 WORLD WAR H INFLATION
available again, holders of the accumulated assets tried to use them to pur-
chase such goods. The attempt to use the accumulated assets tended to
raise prices and incomes and to reduce the ratio of such assets to income.
It is therefore entirely consistent with the preceding analysis that velocity
should have started to rise in early 1946. What is perhaps surprising is
that initially it rose so little and then subsequently rose for so long a pe-
riod, but these puzzles we shall leave for later (section 3, below, and
Chapter 12).
The decline in velocity and of course also the accompanying rise in out-
put explain why prices rose so much more slowly than the stock of
money during the period of wartime deficits. We turn now to the factors
accounting for the rise in the stock of money.
PROXIMATE DETERMINANTS OF THE RISE IN THE MONEY STOCK
As Table 23 shows, the rise in the stock of money during the war was
predominantly accounted for—in an arithmetic sense—by the concurrent
rise in high-powered money, just as it had been in the period of neutrality.
But, precisely paralleling World War I, there was a major difference in
the source of the rise in high-powered money. In both war periods,
Federal Reserve credit outstanding rather than gold accounted for the
rise in high-powered money. The Federal Reserve System again became
essentially the bond-selling window of the Treasury and used its mone-
tary powers almost entirely for that purpose.
The Reserve System performed the same role somewhat differently in
the two wars. In World War I, the System increased its private claims by
discounting member bank bills mostly secured by government obligations;
its own holdings of government securities were small throughout. In
World War II, discounts were small throughout, and the Federal Reserve
increased its credit outstanding by buying government securities. In our
terminology, there was an increase in the fiat of the monetary authorities.
The common effect was an increase in high-powered money which was
distributed between currency and bank reserves—about equally in World
War I, about six-sevenths to currency, one-seventh to reserves in World
War II. The increment in bank reserves, of course, permitted a multi-
ple expansion of bank deposits. The corresponding growth of commercial
bank assets largely took the form of an increase in loans in World War I;
of an increase in holdings of government securities in World War II.
9
But again the difference was largely formal. Perhaps half the World War
I increase in loans to customers was secured by government obligations;
in World War II, the banks purchased the securities directly. Dissatis-
9 From June 1941 to June 1945, the increase in commercial bank holdings of
U.S. government obligations was $64 billion, or 90 per cent of the increase in
commercial bank assets over the period. From June 1917 to June 1919 the increase
in total loans extended by commercial banks was $4.2 billion, or 44 per cent of the
increase in commercial bank assets over the period.WORLD WAR II INFLATION 145
faction with World War I experience led to a shunning of the earlier
forms. Similar political and economic pressures led to the adoption of the
same substance. Some idea of the magnitudes of those operations is given
by the following figures: from November 1941 to January 1946, the
government debt outside the U.S. government and the Federal Reserve
System grew by $178 billion, of which some $69 billion was acquired
by commercial banks; currency held by the public grew by $17 billion;
commercial bank deposits, by $52 billion; and Federal Reserve credit
outstanding, by $22 billion.
In April 1942, the Federal Open Market Committee announced that it
would keep the rate on Treasury bills,
1
0 mostly 90-day maturities, fixed
at % of one per cent per year by buying or selling any amount offered or
demanded at that rate.
1
1 That rate was kept fixed until the middle of
1947. No such rigid commitment was made for other government securi-
ties but an effective pattern was established for them as well—ranging
from roughly % of one per cent for certificates to 0.9 per cent for 13-
month notes, 1.5 per cent for 4%-year notes, and 2.5 per cent for long-
term bonds.
1
2 The System bought whatever amount of these securities was
1
0 Treasury bills are obligations issued on a discount basis with varying maturities
up to 12 months. During the war they were issued weekly, usually for a term of 3
months in denominations from $1,000 to $1,000,000 at maturity.
" On Aug. 7, 1942, the Federal Open Market Committee directed the Federal
Reserve Banks to give the seller a repurchase option at the same rate for an equal
amount of bills of the same maturity, and extended the privilege of sale and re-
purchase to dealers in securities, corporations, and other holders of liquid funds.
1
2 Certificates of indebtedness are Treasury obligations limited by law to a
maturity of one year. They are sold at par plus any accrued interest, and interest
on them is paid at the time of their maturity. They were offered by the Treasury
in Apr. 1942 for the first time since 1934. The term of issue during the period of
war deficits was usually 11 to 12 months. As many as ten issues a year were
offered, usually as of the first of the month, in denominations from $1,000 to
$1,000,000, at a rate, from Nov. 1942 on, of % of one per cent. Maturing issues
were usually refunded into new issues of certificates of indebtedness or occasionally
into 13-month notes to prevent two issues from maturing on the same date.
Treasury notes are obligations with maturity of more than one year and not
over 5 years. They are sold at par plus any accrued interest. Interest rates on them
during the war ranged from about 0.90 per cent on 13-month maturities to 1.25
per cent on those maturing in about 3 years, and to 1.5 per cent on those maturing
in 4% years. During the period of war deficits there were seven issues of Treasury
notes exclusive of 13-month notes, which the market treats like certificates.
Treasury marketable bonds have maturities of more than 5 years. Maturities of
most bonds offered during the war ranged from 10 to 25 years. They were sold
at par plus any accrued interest, the interest rate varying with their maturity as
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necessary to prevent their yields from rising but did not commit itself to
sell them freely in order to prevent yields from falling. The relatively fixed
pattern of rates on government securities was the counterpart in World
War II of the relatively fixed discount rate in World War I.
The support program converted all securities into the equivalent of
money. Since the pattern of rates was carried over from the late thirties
and reflected an abnormally high valuation of liquidity, the Reserve Banks
tended to acquire bills and, to a smaller extent, certificates and, to a
still smaller extent, notes, rather than bonds; and banks to acquire
bonds, notes, and certificates, rather than bills. So long as the bill rate
was kept absolutely fixed, the pattern of rates for other issues could be
maintained only if (1) the Treasury adjusted its issues to provide
only the relatively small amount of bills holders desired at those rates;
or (2) the Federal Reserve System changed the initial composition
of debt instruments issued by the Treasury to the composition holders
desired, by buying bills and other securities as they approached a com-
parable maturity, and by selling bonds. The Treasury was not averse
to a decline in long rates and, as the System's bond portfolio de-
clined (by the end of the war, bonds constituted only $1 billion of the
System's total government security holdings of $23 billion; see Chart 48),
attempts by other holders to get out of short-term securities and into
long-term—"playing the pattern of rates," as it was termed—produced a
decline in yields on long-term securities beginning in 1944.
In late 1942, the discount rate was lowered to % °f
 one per cent on
advances secured by short-term government securities (Chart 49). How-
ever, that change was of little significance since, if banks held such se-
curities, it was generally cheaper for them to acquire any needed reserves
by selling bills yielding % of one per cent rather than by using them as
collateral to borrow at % of one per cent. In 1942 also, the System
lowered reserve requirements for central reserve city banks.
1
3
With government security prices supported, there was no incentive
for banks to hold excess reserves. They could satisfy liquidity needs instead
by holding income-yielding securities. The reduction in excess reserves,
together with the reduction just noted in required reserves, produced a
continued increase in the ratio of bank deposits to bank reserves, from not
quite 4 to 1 in November 1941 to over 6 to 1 by January 1946. Had there
been no change in the deposit-currency ratio, the increase in the de-
posit-reserve ratio would have made the percentage increase in the stock
of money about 1% times the percentage increase in high-powered
1
3 The initial grant of authority in the Banking Act of 1935 to vary reserve
requirements specified a uniform increase or decrease for all central reserve and
reserve city banks and a uniform increase or decrease for all country banks. The
authority to vary requirements for the central reserve city class separately was
granted in July 1942.WORLD WAR II INFLATION 147
CHART 48
Government Securities Held by Federal Reserve Banks,
March 1941-August 1948
Billions of dollars
1 to 5 years
Over 5 years
1941 '42 '43
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bulletin.
'44 '45 '46 '48
money. However, about half the excess of that 1% over unity was offset
by a continued decline in the deposit-currency ratio from 6 to 1 in
November 1941 to 4 to 1 in January 1946. In his detailed analysis of the
deposit-currency ratio, Cagan has attributed its decline during the war in
part to increased use of currency in preference to deposits as a means of
avoiding increased income tax levies, in part to black market activities,




The direction of movement of both deposit ratios was the same in
" See Phillip Cagan's forthcoming volume on determinants and effects of changes
in the U.S. money stock, 1875-1955, a National Bureau study.148 WORLD WAR II INFLATION
CHART 49
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NOTE: Short-dated government securities, for which discount rate is shown, are due or callable
in one year or less.
SOURCE: Same as for Chart 41, except that FRB is source for 1942-48 data.
World War II as in World War I. However, the relative importance of
the changes differed sharply. In World War I, the decline in the deposit-
currency ratio was some two to three times as important in its effect on
the stock of money as the rise in the deposit-reserve ratio; in World
War II, the relative importance was reversed.
The bond drives of World War II placed much emphasis on avoiding
the sale of securities to commercial banks on the ground that purchases
by banks were "inflationary" in a sense in which purchases by others
were not. Certain issues were made ineligible for bank purchase and
attempts were made to "tailor" other issues to particular classes of pur-WORLD WAR II INFLATION 149
chasers. At the same time, however, contradictory policies were also
followed. The Federal Reserve System encouraged banks to purchase
government securities by assurance that it would make reserves available.
As stated in its 1942 Annual Report, "... the Federal Reserve authori-
ties endeavored to induce banks to make more complete use of their exist-
ing reserves and also supplied them with such reserve funds as they
needed from time to time to purchase the Government securities offered
to them."
1
5 The Treasury, moreover, offered a large percentage of its
securities at rates unattractive to nonbank investors.
1
6
The attempts to avoid sales to commercial banks—which, partly be-
cause of the contradictory policies followed, did not succeed—rested
on a misconception based on a failure to distinguish between sales to
Reserve Banks and sales to commercial banks. Sales to Reserve Banks
created high-powered money. For given deposit-reserve and deposit-
currency ratios, each additional dollar of high-powered money meant an
increment of several additional dollars of money—the famous multiple
expansion. However, for a given level of high-powered money, the
identity of the purchasers of securities and, in particular, their identity
as commercial banks or others could affect the stock of money "only if it
affected one of the deposit ratios, and it is hard to see why it should
have any appreciable effect on either.
1
7
Still more basically, it is necessary to distinguish here, as it was in
earlier chapters, between the arithmetic of changes in the money supply,
just outlined, and the economics of the changes. Given the monetary
policy of supporting a nearly fixed pattern of rates on government securi-
ties, the Federal Reserve System had no effective control over the quantity
of high-powered money. It had to create whatever quantity was neces-
sary to keep rates at that level. Though it is convenient to describe the
process as running from an increase in high-powered money to an in-
crease in the stock of money through deposit-currency and deposit-
reserve ratios, the chain of influence in fact ran in the opposite direction
—from the increase in the stock of money consistent with the specified
pattern of rates and other economic conditions to the increment in high-
powered money required to produce that increase. It is an elementary
economic truism, applicable to the money market as elsewhere, that one
cannot simultaneously control both the price and the quantity of a good
without some explicit rationing mechanism. If the price is fixed, the
1
5 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, 1942, p. 9.
" See Clark Warburton, "Monetary Policy in the United States in World War
II," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Apr. 1945, pp. 377-389; idem,
"A Hedge Against Inflation," Political Science Quarterly, Mar. 1952, pp. 5-8.
" See Friedman, A Program for Monetary Stability, New York, Fordham Uni-
versity Press, 1960, pp. 53-55 and 107, footnote 1, for further discussion of the
monetary effects of sales of government securities to commercial banks.150 WORLD WAR II INFLATION
quantity must be permitted to be whatever is consistent with that price,
and conversely.
Success in avoiding sales to commercial banks could have been achieved
by making the securities more attractive to nonbank purchasers by offer-
ing them higher returns. That would have involved a change in the
pattern of rates pegged and could therefore have had a significant in-
fluence. A smaller increase in the total stock of money, and hence in
high-powered money, would have been necessary to support the alternative
higher pattern of rates than the actual pattern, since the higher rates
would have made holding bonds more attractive relative to holding
money. One consequence would also have been a higher velocity.
BASIC DETERMINANTS OF THE RISE IN THE MONEY STOCK
Given the pattern of rates supported, what determined the amount of
increase in the stock of money? It is difficult enough to answer the ques-
tion in abstract terms. It is far more difficult to fill in the details or to
explain why the magnitudes involved were what they were, and we shall
not attempt to do so at all exhaustively. For our purposes, we may regard
the physical quantity of resources to be used by government as fixed by
other considerations—though, of course, still more basically, the quantity
might well have been revised, if it had been associated with a very differ-
ent level of inflationary pressure. The quantity of resources used by gov-
ernment had to be matched by a corresponding release of resources by
the members of the community. They received incomes corresponding to
essentially the whole of resources employed, and they had to be persuaded
or induced or forced to refrain from exercising command over a fraction
of those resources corresponding to the fraction employed by the govern-
ment. The financial counterpart of the release of resources was the pay-
ment of taxes, or the accumulation of claims against the government in
the form of either interest-bearing government securities or noninterest-
bearing debt of the government, the three together being equal over any
period to the expenditures of the government. The increase in the stock
of money had to be whatever was necessary to render the sum of the
three items equal to the expenditures of the government. Part of the
increase in the stock of money took the form of government issue of
money, part took the form of whatever increase in privately created
money (in that period, bank deposits not matched by an increment in
reserves) was necessary to provide the public with the ratio of deposits
to currency it desired and the banks with the ratio of deposits to reserves
they desired.
It should be emphasized that all these items were being simultaneously
determined. What we have taken as fixed was the physical quantity of
resources to be used by government, not government expenditures. IfWORLD WAR II INFLATION 151
prices (needless to say, as "correctly" measured, not as recorded in a
necessarily imperfect index number) were constant during the process,
any issue of money would correspond to "voluntary saving." It would
mean that the public wished to add that amount to its real assets in the
form of the noninterest-bearing obligations we call money.
1
8 And con-
versely, prices could remain constant only if the public did wish to add
to its real assets in the form of interest- and noninterest-bearing obliga-
tions an amount equal to the excess of government expenditures at those
prices over tax receipts at those prices. If prices rose during the process,
the issue of money would correspond partly to "voluntary saving"—
insofar as the real and not only the nominal value of the money stock
rose—and partly to a tax on money balances. The nominal increment in
the money stock required to keep its real value unchanged can be re-
garded as vouchers recording the payment of this tax on money balances.
1
9
In any event, the government could acquire real resources only through
either taxation—consisting in part of explicit taxes, in part of an implicit
tax on money balances—or borrowing, consisting in part of borrowing
in a noninterest-bearing form. The distribution between taxes and bor-
rowing was determined in part by the level of taxes imposed by legisla-




The major government actions affecting the amount by which the
money stock increased were therefore the decisions about how much real
resources to devote to the war effort, the level of tax rates enacted,
measures affecting voluntary saving, and measures affecting the fraction
of their savings individuals wished to use to add to their holdings of
money. For the period of war or wartime deficits, over 45 per cent of total
federal expenditures were financed by explicit taxes. This was an impres-
sive performance in comparison with that in World War I, but it left a
much larger deficit compared with national income because of the
1
8 Insofar as the issue of money was in the form of privately created money, the
government was in essence sharing its monopoly of the issuance of noninterest-
bearing securities with the commercial banks. From the government's point of
view, it issued interest-bearing obligations corresponding to that part of the hypo-
thetical "voluntary saving."
1
9 Insofar as the issue of money was in the form of privately issued money, the
government was in effect sharing the proceeds of the tax on money balances with
commercial banks (see Friedman, "Price, Income, and Monetary Changes," pp.
619-625).
30 For a fuller analysis, see Friedman, "Discussion of the Inflationary Gap," in
Essays in Positive Economics, University of Chicago Press, 1955, pp. 251-262; also
Martin Bailey, "The Welfare Cost of Inflationary Finance," Journal of Political
Economy, Apr. 1956, pp. 93-110; Armen A. Alchian and Reuben A. Kessel,
"Redistribution of Wealth through Inflation," Science, Sept. 4, 1959, pp. 537-539;
Ralph Turvey, "Inflation as a Tax in World War II," Journal of Political Econ-
omy, Feb. 1961, pp. 72-73; and Friedman, "Price, Income, and Monetary
Changes," loc. cit. See also above, Chap. 2, footnote 64, and Chap. 5, footnote 35.152 WORLD WAR II INFLATION
larger magnitude of the war effort. We have already noted that the
cessation of production of certain durable goods had the effect of raising
voluntary saving. The rationing of other goods and the limited availability
of still others may have had a similar effect. Aside from government
measures, the widespread fear of a postwar depression worked in the
same direction. The pattern of interest rates fixed on government obliga-
tions also affected the level of voluntary saving—a higher level of interest
rates would have given a greater inducement to save, a lower level,
a lesser inducement—but probably had its main effect on the form sav-
ings took. It seems not unlikely that the much higher level of rates paid
on government securities in World War I than in World War II is one
reason the nonbank public increased its holdings of government securities
by about three dollars for every one dollar increase in its money stock in
World War I and by only half that amount in World War II.
By comparison with World War I, the impressive difference is that
despite a much larger war effort, longer continued deficits, and larger
deficits relative to national income, prices rose more slowly during World
War II than during World War I, both during the whole of the period
from the start of the war to the postwar price peak, and apparently also
during the period of wartime deficits. There appear to be two main
reasons for the difference, neither having much to do with the design of
government policy. The first is the much greater increase in willingness
to save in World War II, the monetary counterpart of which was the
decline in velocity during the war, discussed above. The second is that
the tax on money balances implicit in inflationary money creation was a
much more productive tax in World War II than in World War I, be-
cause of the lower velocity prevailing during World War II than during
World War I (Table 24, line 3). Money balances averaged 45 per cent of
one year's national income in 1914—20, 69 per cent in 1939-48. A 1 per
cent tax on money balances—if we ignore the reflex influence of the tax
on the amount of money balances held—therefore yielded 0.45 per cent
of a year's national income in World War I, 0.69 per cent, or about 1%
times as much, in World War II.
This is the computation needed to judge the importance of the increase
in the public's money stock. An additional problem is the fraction of the
increase in the money stock created directly by the government and the
fraction created by the banks or, to put it differently, the sharing of the
tax yield between the government and the banks. The implicit sharing
arrangement determines how much money the government can issue per
dollar increase in the total money stock; or, alternatively, how much of
its deficit it can finance by issuing money, how much by bonds, and how
much of the bonds directly or indirectly must go to banks. In this respect,
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War I inflation (1914-20), the total money stock increased $6.92 for
every dollar of government-created money (high-powered money minus
the gold stock), in the World War II inflation (1939-48), $4.74. The main
reason for the difference was the change in the ratio of deposits to re-
serves. During the World War I inflation, banks added $14.16 to their
deposits for every dollar increase in reserves; during the World War II
TABLE 24
COMPARISON OF MONEY CREATION IN TWO WORLD WAR PERIODS OF INFLATION
Period of Inflation
World War I World War II
1914-20 1939-48
Money created by government as a fraction of average
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NOTE: Figures for money stock, high-powered money, and gold stock are annual
averages centered on June 30. Averages for each war period weight the initial and
terminal years each as one-half year.
Government-created money equals high-powered money minus the gold stock.
inflation, $10.47. A subsidiary reason was a change in the relation be-
tween deposit and currency expansion—in World War I, the public added
$6.91 to its deposits per dollar increase in currency; in World War II
only $3.89.
For the war inflations as a whole, the effects of these differences are
summarized in Table 24. As this table shows, the combined effect of the
changes in the level of velocity and in the expansion ratio of the monetary
system was that the government was able to acquire twice as large a
fraction of average annual income (1.6 instead of 0.8 per cent, line 2)154 WORLD WAR II INFLATION
by direct money creation, yet produce only seven-eighths as large an in-
crease in the total money stock per year (11.1 per cent instead of 12.7
per cent, line 9). This smaller increase in the total money stock was in
its turn equivalent to a decidedly larger fraction of average annual in-
come (7.7 per cent instead of 5.8 per cent, line 11) so that both directly
and indirectly money creation was a more effective device for acquiring
resources for government purposes.
In terms of federal government expenditures during the period of war-
time deficits, 48 per cent was financed by explicit taxes; 7 per cent by
direct government money creation; 14 per cent by private money issue,
which can be regarded as the indirect effect of government money crea-
tion but had as its nominal counterpart interest-bearing rather than non-
interest-bearing government debt; and 31 per cent by interest-bearing
government securities not matched by money creation. If the wholesale
price index is regarded as correctly measuring the price changes during
the war, then about one-fifth of the money creation can be regarded as a
tax on money balances, four-fifths as voluntary saving embodied in the
form of noninterest-bearing monetary assets.
2
1 This would mean that, in
all, slightly over half of expenditures was financed by taxes, and that
about one-tenth of the taxes took the form of a tax on money balances.
The defects of the price index mean that these figures probably under-
estimate the importance of taxes as a fraction of expenditures and of
the tax on money balances as a fraction of total taxes.
EFFECT OF WAR LOAN DRIVES
One detail of the behavior of the money stock merits attention before
we leave the period. In Chart 46 it will be noted that the money stock
behaved in a much more irregular fashion during 1943, in particular,
but also in 1944 and 1945, than it did before or after. The reason was the
flotation of government securities through a series of bond drives—seven
War Loan drives and a concluding Victory Loan—about five months
apart, November 1942-December 1945. As it happened, three of the
bond drives came in the final months of the year and two in the middle,
2
1 Wholesale prices rose 14 per cent from Dec. 1941 to Dec. 1945 (roughly the
initial and terminal dates of the calendar years included in our estimate of federal
government expenditures during the period of wartime deficits). The nominal
amount of money that would have been required to keep money balances at their
initial real level was 13 per cent of the actual increase from Dec. 1941 to Dec.
1945. The amount that would have been required to maintain money balances at
their terminal real level was 24 per cent of the actual increase. The correct figure,
assuming the price rise to be correct, is between these two, and we have approxi-
mated it as 20 per cent.
For simplicity, we have combined direct and indirect money creation, and have
neglected the assignment of part of what we have called the tax proceeds to the
commercial banks. For a more refined analysis, see Ralph Turvey, "Inflation as a
Tax in World War II," Journal of Political Economy, Feb. 1961, pp. 72-73.WORLD WAR II INFLATION 155
CHART 50
Member Bank Deposits During War Bond Drives, With and Without
U.S. Government War Loan Deposits, Monthly and Semimonthly
Averages, Unadjusted for Seasonal Changes, 1942—45
Billions of dollars
Number of bond drive
3 4 5 6 Victory
Total deposits adjusted and





NOTE: Shaded areas represent periods of bond drives.
SOURCE: Data are monthly or semimonthly averages of daily figures, seasonally unadjusted,
from FR8. Total deposits adjusted are demand deposits adjusted plus time deposits. Dates of
bond drives, from Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, 1946, p. 507.
which meant that they had some of the repetitive effects characteristic
of a seasonal movement. As a result, their effects have been to some
extent eliminated from the seasonally adjusted series plotted in Chart 46.
That is mainly why the irregularity produced by the bond drives in our
money series is much greater for 1943 than for 1944 and 1945.
Chart 50 is designed to enable us to study in some detail the effects of
the bond drives. It is restricted to deposits, since the bond drives had no
noticeable effects on currency, and to member banks only, because for
that period we have monthly or semimonthly averages of daily figures for
them but not for all commercial banks. It plots figures unadjusted for
seasonal variations to avoid inadvertent elimination of any bond drive
effects. The bottom line in the chart is for demand and time deposits
owned by the public and thus excludes U.S. government deposits. The
top line is the same total plus U.S. government deposits. The shaded
areas in the chart are the periods of the bond drives.
On the occasion of each bond drive, purchasers of securities trans-156 WORLD WAR II INFLATION
ferred deposits to war loan accounts maintained by the Treasury at
commercial banks. As the government transferred its deposits from war
loan accounts to Federal Reserve Banks, and thence to the public to pay
for its expenditures, government deposits were transferred back to private
accounts. This process is clearly marked in the chart. On the occasion of
each bond drive, the upper line rises and the lower falls. Between drives,
the reverse occurs.
After April 1943, the war loan accounts maintained by the Treasury
were exempt from reserve requirements, so any transfer of funds to those
accounts in the first instance reduced required reserves. If reserves held
had risen steadily and if banks had taken full advantage of the released
reserves, so that required reserves had risen during bond drives as they
did between drives, the banks could have kept the lower line in Chart 50
free from any effects of the bond drives. On the occasion of each drive,
they could have expanded their total earning assets to the amount of the de-
posits transferred to war loan accounts and subsequently could have reduced
their earning assets as the war loan accounts were reduced. Under these
hypothetical circumstances, our money stock figures, like the lower line
of the chart, would have been unaffected by the bond drives. The whole
of the effect would have been recorded in the upper line.
Conversely, if reserves held had risen steadily and if banks had taken
no advantage of the reserves released by the transfer of deposits, so that
required reserves had fallen during bond drives and risen between drives,
the banks could have kept the upper line of Chart 50 free from any
effects of the bond drives; the full effect would have been recorded in
the lower line.
The actual situation was roughly midway between these extremes, as
can be seen by noting that the fluctuations about the straight lines we
have drawn to indicate the trends in the two series are not much dif-
ferent in amplitude for the upper than for the lower series.
There are three reasons the actual situation did not correspond to
the first extreme. (1) The actual behavior of reserves was not that as-
sumed above. During some of the drives, specifically the second
through the fifth (April to May 1943-July to August 1944), the Reserve
System offset some of the effect of the transfer of deposits by reducing its
credit outstanding. To some extent, therefore, the declines in the lower
line of Chart 50 reflect changes in available reserves. (2) The full use of
the released reserves would have involved substantial transaction costs,
since it implied first acquiring and then disposing of assets as government
war loan accounts first increased and then decreased. (3) No doubt, it
took time for banks to realize the possibilities of taking measures to in-
crease deposits in advance or coincidentally with the drive itself, rather
than subsequently when its effect was manifest in excess reserves. As timeWORLD WAR II INFLATION 157
went on, the banks adjusted more fully to the bond drives. Visual evi-
dence is provided by the chart, in which the fluctuations of the upper
curve about its straight-line trend become wider, if anything, in amplitude,
whereas fluctuations of the lower curve become a trifle narrower. And
some rough calculations confirm this visual impression.
2
2
3. From the End of the War to the Price Peak,
August 19 45-August 1948
Economic activity reached its wartime peak early in 1945 when it became
clear that the end of the war was approaching. The National Bureau
dates the reference peak in February 1945. Demobilization began after
V-E Day (May 8, 1945), continued at an accelerated pace after V-J
Day (September 2, 1945), and was accompanied by a sharp decrease in
government expenditures and a rapid decline in industrial production.
Nevertheless, the contraction was brief and relatively mild and the heavy
unemployment that was widely feared did not develop. The trough,
which the National Bureau dates in October 1945, was followed by a
vigorous expansion. A decline in government purchases of goods and
services from $83 billion in 1945 to $30 billion in 1946 was offset by
rapid conversion from wartime to peacetime production. Seasonally
adjusted unemployment in 1945 never reached 2.5 million and remained
below that level thereafter until beyond the end of the expansion in
November 1948.
After a brief pause in the third quarter of 1945, the wholesale price
index continued rising and, as we have already noted, jumped sharply in
mid-1946 when price control was dropped. The 16.4 per cent per year
rate of rise in the wholesale price index from January 1946 to August
2
2 For example, the ratio of the rise in the upper curve to the decline in the
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For a more sophisticated calculation, allowance should be made for point 1 in
the text. Such a more sophisticated calculation and, in general, a more detailed
study of the effects of the bond drives than we have made would be of considerable
interest. It might, for example, provide additional evidence on the time required
for adjustment by the banking system to changes in circumstances.
We are indebted to George Morrison for pointing out to us that the use of
seasonally adjusted figures in an earlier version had led us to erroneous conclu-
sions about the reactions of banks to the bond drives.158 WORLD WAR II INFLATION
1948 overstates substantially the rate of rise in prices during the period.
Nonetheless, there was clearly a price rise of considerable magnitude. The
rise in prices and in income reflected mostly the rise in velocity referred
to earlier, rather than a growth of the money stock. The money stock
grew only 14 per cent from the end of the war to August 1948 and only
11 per cent, or at the rate of only a little over 4 per cent per year, from
January 1946 to August 1948.
2
3
The rise in the money stock itself from January 1946 to August 1948
was attributable, in an arithmetic sense, mostly to growth of high-
powered money. In sharp contrast with the corresponding period after
World War I (when the gold stock fell and the increase in high-powered
money came from a rapid expansion in Federal Reserve claims on the
public and the banks), this time the increase in high-powered money
was produced by a rise in the gold stock, about a third of which was
offset by a decline in the fiat of the monetary authorities (see Tables 23
and 10). The gold inflow occurred despite U.S. participation in UNRRA
—which was authorized even before the termination of lend-lease—the
subsequent loan to Britain, and the Marshall Plan. Though these uni-
lateral transfers satisfied many of the pressing demands of war-devastated
countries, the residual demands, as well as the demands of neutral
countries desiring goods not available during the war, led to a gold inflow.
A rise in the ratio of deposits to currency was as important as the in-
crease in high-powered money in accounting for the increase in the stock
of money. With the end of the war, the wartime factors affecting the
demand for currency lost their influence, and the public increased its
deposits relative to currency holdings. However, a minor part of the rise
in the deposit-currency ratio was offset by a slight decline in the deposit-
reserve ratio.
This description of postwar monetary changes needs to be supple-
mented by some account of events within the period. The slight decline
in the deposit-reserve ratio was the net result of a rise from January 1946
to May 1947, which was more than offset by the subsequent decline to
August 1948. A shift of deposits away from reserve and central reserve
city banks, with higher reserve requirements, toward country banks
mainly accounted for the movement in the deposit-reserve ratio from
2
3 The coverage of the money stock series in 1948 is not strictly comparable to
that of the series in 1945 and 1946 (see Appendix A). Currency held by the
public in 1948 includes vault cash in banks in territories and the possessions, as
well as in U.S. mutual savings banks; such vault cash is excluded in the earlier
years. Likewise, demand balances of mutual savings banks at U.S. commercial
banks are included in adjusted deposits in 1948, excluded in the earlier years.
The percentage change figures in the text would not, however, be altered by re-
vision of the 1945-46 money stock estimates to make them comparable to the
later one. The excluded items totaled $165-$ 170 million in 1945-46, or slightly
more than one-tenth of 1 per cent of the money stock excluding them.WORLD WAR II INFLATION 159
August 1945 to April 1947; we do not know what accounts for the initial
fall thereafter, but the noticeable acceleration of the fall after February
1948 clearly reflects three increases in reserve requirements imposed over
the following seven months.
The expansion in high-powered money was concentrated within the
11 months from August 1945 to July 1946 ($1.9 billion) and the 15
months from May 1947 to August 1948 ($1.1 billion; see Chart 46).
High-powered money was $3.1 billion higher at the end of August 1948
than at the end of August 1945, but only $1.2 billion higher than at the
end of July 1946. From July 1946 to May 1947, the decline in the fiat of
the monetary authorities just about offset the rise in the gold stock, so
that high-powered money was roughly unchanged (see Chart 47B).
The initial and terminal expansions in high-powered money played
quite different monetary roles. The first was a source of monetary expan-
sion. The second was not; it was rather a reaction to other monetary
measures.
Most of the terminal $1.1 billion increase in high-powered money from
May 1947 to August 1948 was a reaction to changes in reserve require-
ments (Chart 49). Reserve requirements for member banks in central
reserve cities were raised $1 billion by an increase of 4 points in the
percentage they were required to maintain against demand deposits. The
increase was imposed in two equal steps on February 27 and June 11,
1948. To acquire the added reserves, banks sold government securities
which, under the support program, the Reserve System was committed
to buy. Those security purchases thereby added to Reserve credit out-
standing. (In September, a third increase affecting all member banks,
and time as well as demand deposits, raised reserve requirements a fur-
ther $2 billion. As a result, member banks sold government securities to
the Federal Reserve, and Reserve Bank credit showed another increase—
see the next chapter.)
In contrast, the initial increase in high-powered money from August
1945 to July 1946 provided the banks with a net addition to their re-
serves in excess of requirements. The money stock rose vigorously, by
$11.1 billion, as compared with $5.3 billion in the period of stationary
high-powered money from July 1946 to May 1947 and $1.8 billion in
the terminal period of increase in high-powered money.
2
4 The money stock
therefore grew decidedly more in the first 11 months of the three-year
period than in the next 25 months. The money stock reached an absolute
peak in January 1948 and declined mildly for the next 12 months,
foreshadowing the approaching price peak and the recession of 1948 to
1949. This is another example of the previously observed tendency of
monetary changes to precede changes in economic conditions.
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The foremost monetary puzzle of the immediate postwar period is
why the money stock did not grow at a very much more rapid pace. The
sharp difference from its behavior after World War I, when the
most rapid rate of increase in the stock of money came after the end of
the wartime deficits, does not reflect any fundamental difference in mone-
tary policy. After both wars, the Reserve System continued the wartime
policy of providing all the high-powered money demanded at a fixed
rate: in World War I, through maintaining an unchanged discount rate;
in World War II, through supporting the price of government securities
at unchanged levels. And the reversal of the gold flows, from an outflow
after World War I to an inflow after World War II, should have fostered
a more rapid rate of monetary expansion after the later war.
Federal Reserve pronouncements were full of expressions of concern
about the inflationary danger of the large stock of money, and about the
necessity to avoid further expansion. Yet, until the middle of 1947, action
was limited to requests for additional powers;
2
5 changes in discount rates
which were of no significance (because the System continued its wartime
support of the bill rate at % of 1 per cent and the certificate rate at
% of 1 per cent, so that it continued to be cheaper for banks to meet
reserve needs by selling such securities of which they held substantial
amounts rather than by discounting) ;
2
6 and an increase in margin re-
quirements on security purchases to 100 per cent in January 1946 fol-
lowed by a reduction to 75 per cent in February 1947 (see Chart 49).
Consumer credit controls were continued until November 1, 1947, when
the Congress terminated the authority of the Board of Governors to
regulate such credit. With the expansion of production of consumer
durable goods, the controls became relevant as they had not been during
the war. They may have limited the growth of this type of credit some-
2
5 The Board of Governors suggested (Annual Report, 1945, pp. 7-8) that three
additional powers be granted the System:
1. To limit the amount of long-term securities which any commercial bank
could hold in relation to its net demand deposits
2. To require all commercial banks to maintain secondary reserves of Treasury
bills and certificates in addition to their high-powered money reserves against
net demand deposits
3. To raise reserve requirements, within some specified limit, against net demand
deposits of any commercial bank
2
6 By the end of Apr. 1946, the preferential discount rate of 1 per cent on
advances to nonmember banks secured by direct obligations of the U.S. was elimi-
nated at all Reserve Banks. Thereafter the rate in effect on loans to individuals,
partnerships, and corporations (the rate ranged from 2^4 to 2% per cent by the
end of 1948) applied to advances to nonmember banks. In Apr. and May 1946
all the Reserve Banks discontinued the preferential discount rate of 0.5 per cent
on advances to member banks secured by government obligations maturing or call-
able within a year, and the prevailing discount rate of 1 per cent became applica-
ble to advances secured by all maturities of government obligations.WORLD WAR II INFLATION 161
what but it is doubtful that they could have been a major factor affecting
the growth of the money stock as a whole.
Yet from mid-1946 on, the rate of growth of the money stock fell
sharply. The announced readiness of the Federal Reserve Banks to sup-
port the price of government securities led to no extensive monetization
of the debt; on the contrary, Federal Reserve credit outstanding remained
roughly constant during 1946 and then fell sharply in the spring of 1947.
Yields on long-term government debt were below support levels through-
out 1946 and the first part of 1947, so that the System could have sold
long-term securities without violating its support policy. It did not do so,
however, and indeed could not have gone far on its own in this direction,
since it held less than $1 billion of such securities. Its holdings were in
bills and certificates, and there was little demand for these at the support
rates (see Chart 48).




t interest rate on long-term securities
which the Federal Reserve was committed to protect was below the level
consistent with no change in the stock of money and required for its
maintenance the continuous creation of high-powered money—as was the
3 to 4 per cent discount rate in the active phase of World War I, and
the same or a higher rate for some eighteen months thereafter. By con-
trast, less than a year after the active phase of World War II, the same
2% P
e
r cent rate was above the level consistent with no change in the
stock of money and would have required for its rigid maintenance the
destruction of high-powered money.
During the immediate postwar period and for some time thereafter,
the Federal Reserve System did not question, at least officially, the
desirability of supporting the price of government obligations.
2
7 But it
did favor raising the bill and certificate support rates. On July 10, 1947,
the posted % of 1 per cent buying rate on Treasury bills and the repur-
chase option granted to sellers of bills were terminated, though the
pegged rate of % of 1 per cent on certificates was maintained. It has been
reported that the Treasury, which had been reluctant to see any change
in the pattern of rates, consented to the rise in the interest costs on its
short-term debt because of the offset created by the adoption on April 23,
1947, by the Federal Reserve System of a policy of paying into the




"See statements in Annual Report, 1945, p. 7; 1946, p. 6; 1947, p. 8; 1948,
pp. 2, 4, 20; 1949, pp. 7-8; 1950, p. 2; 1951, pp. 3, 4, 95, 98.
2
8 This was accomplished under the authority granted to the Board (sect. 16 of
the Federal Reserve Act) to levy an interest charge on Federal Reserve notes not
covered by gold certificates. Before 1933, each Federal Reserve Bank had to pay
a franchise tax to the government equal to 90 per cent of its net earnings, after
it had accumulated a surplus equal to its capital. That provision was repealed by162 WORLD WAR II INFLATION
On August 8, 1947, the Federal Open Market Committee took the
next step in the program of raising the support rates somewhat, by dis-
continuing the % per cent buying rate on certificates. The Treasury
progressively raised the rate on newly issued certificates until it reached
1% per cent in December 1947. At the same time, the bill rate moved up
to 1 per cent. Not until the fourth quarter of 1948, after the price peak,
did the Treasury increase the certificate rate to 1 % per cent and the rate
on bills to about 1 % per cent.
In addition to these measures, the Treasury changed the composition
of the debt by increasing the amount of long-term debt relative to short,
thereby achieving the same effect as the Federal Reserve could have by
selling long-term securities and buying short-term, if it had had the long-
term securities to sell.
2
9 Yields firmed, rising from 2.26 per cent in mid-
October 1947 to 2.37 in mid-November. At that point the Federal Re-
serve and Treasury stepped in to prevent a further increase in yields,
which is to say, decline in the price of bonds. The System bought $2
billion in government bonds in November and December, and Treasury
investment accounts bought over $900 million. On December 24, the
Federal Open Market Committee established a new lower support level
for the price of government bonds and yields rose to 2.45 per cent. This
was the level at which prices of long-term governments were maintained
through 1948, the System buying an additional $3 billion through March
1948.
The sharp narrowing of the differential between short and long rates as
a result of the rise in the rates on bills and certificates made short-term
securities relatively more attractive to holders, led them to shift the com-
position of their portfolios, and thereby produced a reverse shift in the
the amendment to the Federal Reserve Act, contained in the Banking Act of 1933,
providing for the establishment of the FDIC. The Congress required each Reserve
Bank to subscribe to the capital stock of the FDIC an amount equal to one-half
of its surplus on Jan. 1, 1933. Because of the reduction in their surplus as a result
of the subscription, the Reserve Banks were relieved of the franchise tax. Earnings
over the period ending 1944 were sufficient to restore the surplus only to less than
75 per cent of the Banks' subscribed capital. In 1945 and 1946, however, earnings
were large enough to increase the surplus above the combined capital of the
Banks.
The relationship between the action on earnings and the elimination of the
posted % of 1 per cent buying rate is implied in the record of the Federal Open
Market Committee, which reports discussions with representatives of the Treasury
including those items on the agenda (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, Annual Report, 1947, pp. 90—92). See Commercial and Financial Chroni-
cle, July 10, 1947, p. 20 (124), for the suggestion that the transfer of Federal
Reserve earnings to the Treasury was the quid pro quo for Treasury acquiescence
in the rise in interest costs.
2
9 From Apr. to Oct. 1947, the Treasury sold $1.8 billion of bonds held in
its own investment accounts, and in Oct. issued a new nonmarketable 2-J-& per
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Federal Reserve System's portfolio (Chart 48). That shift rather than
any net monetization of debt accounted for the Federal Reserve pur-
chases just listed. The purchase of $5 billion of bonds from November
1947 through March 1948 was accompanied by a reduction of some $6
billion in the System's holdings of short-term government securities, so
that Federal Reserve credit outstanding was more than $1 billion lower
at the end of March 1948 than at the end of October 1947. The an-
nounced pattern of rates taken as a whole, therefore, continued to be
above rather than below the level consistent with no change in the money
stock. Since the pattern was then made effective, whereas before that
actual rates had been below the announced rates, monetary contraction
was, as we have seen, actually produced during calendar 1948.
The situation was not recognized at the time. Concern continued to
focus on inflation even though, in retrospect, it is clear inflationary
pressure was rapidly waning and the seeds of a contraction were being
sown. In November 1947, the System tried its by now almost traditional
confession of impotence—resort to moral suasion. A joint statement by
bank supervisory authorities was issued to banks urging them to avoid
making nonessential loans. In January 1948, discount rates at all Reserve
Banks were raised to 1.25 per cent, and in August, to 1.5 per cent but,
since in both cases market yields on bills and certificates were lower,
neither rate was effective. More significantly, as already noted, reserve
requirements were raised. Since country and reserve city bank require-
ments were at their prior legal maximums, the final rise—which occurred
in September 1948, a month after the price peak—was applicable to all
banks only because an act of Congress passed in the preceding month had
authorized a temporary increase in the legal maximums, which were to
revert to their former level in June 1949.
3
0 In August 1948, Congress
also restored Federal Reserve control over consumer credit until June
1949, when control was once again permitted to terminate.
A counterpart of the relatively small rise in the money stock during
the period from 1946 to 1948 was the relatively small rise in velocity. As
we have seen, velocity fell by more than a third between 1942 and 1946.
The rise from 1946 to 1948 offset less than a quarter of this decline,
leaving velocity in 1948 at less than three-quarters its level in 1942 and
at only seven-eighths its level in 1939, which itself was low by historical
standards. Yet one might have expected both the attempt to "use" the
wartime accumulation of liquid assets and the rising prices that rendered
it costly to hold money balances to produce a sharp rise in velocity, which
8
0 The new maximums against net demand deposits were 30 per cent at central
reserve city banks, 24 per cent at reserve city banks, and 18 per cent at country
banks, and against time deposits, 7% per cent at all banks. The requirement im-
posed in September was 26, 22, 16, and 7% per cent, respectively.164 WORLD WAR II INFLATION
would, of course, have further intensified the price rise. To put the matter
in terms of liquid asset holdings: in 1939, the year the war broke out in
Europe, the public held money balances amounting to about 8 months'
income, and mutual and postal savings deposits plus savings and loan
association shares plus government securities amounting to an additional
5 months' income; so the total of those liquid assets amounted to 13
months' income. By 1946, money balances amounted to over 10 months
of a much higher income and the broader total of liquid assets to 21
months' income. In the next two years, the public—despite its pent-up
demand for goods unavailable earlier and despite vigorous economic ex-
pansion—reduced those balances only moderately: money to 9 months'
income, about half-way between the prewar and immediate postwar
levels; and the broader total of liquid assets to 18 months' income, or
only three-eighths of the way back to the prewar level.
The connection between the changes in velocity and the public's
willingness to hold liquid assets fixed in nominal amount perhaps helps
to make clear why the low rate of increase in the money stock and the
small rise in velocity are different aspects of essentially the same phe-
nomenon. Both reflect a willingness on the part of the public to hold
relatively large amounts of money and government securities at fairly low
rates of interest. Paradoxical though it may seem, the low rate of increase
in the money stock reflected the public's willingness to hold much money,
as part of its willingness to hold much of its assets in liquid form. Had
the public desired to dispose of more of its liquid assets, the attempt to
do so would have tended to drive down prices of government securities
and raise their yields, which, in turn, would have led the Federal Reserve,
in pursuance of its support program, to buy government securities, thereby
raising high-powered money and the total stock of money.
How was it that an interest rate of 2% per cent on long-term govern-
ment securities was above the level consistent with a stable money stock
in a period of expansion and rising prices; or, equivalently, that at this
rate, the public was willing to hold an abnormally high quantity of
nominal dollar assets relative to its income?
One factor was the large surplus of the government in the calendar
years 1946 through 1948: in 1946, which was a transitional year with
respect to the money stock as well, the cash surplus was a nominal $0.04
billion; in 1947, $5.7 billion; and in 1948, $8.0 billion. The effect of the
associated debt requirement on the technical monetary position has already
been taken into account implicitly in our discussion of the arithmetic of the
change in the money stock.
3
1 In any event, given the support policy of the
3
1 In 1946, the Treasury used its unusually large General Fund balance, derived
from overborrowing in the Victory Loan, to retire debt. That was a bookkeeping
operation involving the simultaneous reduction of deposits in war loan accountsWORLD WAR n INFLATION 165
Reserve System, the money stock during that period, as during the war,
had to be whatever was consistent with the supported pattern of rates,
and one or another of the proximate determinants—in practice primarily
high-powered money—had to adapt to produce that stock. Hence, the
important effects of the surplus are to be found elsewhere. Just as, during
the war, any excess of federal expenditures over tax receipts had to be
matched by an accumulation of government obligations—noninterest-
bearing or interest-bearing—by the public at large, so after the war, an
excess of federal receipts had to be matched by a reduction of govern-
ment obligations. Put differently, during the war, the federal govern-
ment spent more than it received in taxes, so the members of the public
had to spend less than they received as income. The rise in prices was
one factor inducing them to do so, and the rise in the stock of money
was one form in which they accumulated their unspent receipts. After
the war, the federal government took in more in taxes than it spent, so
the members of the public had to spend more than they received as in-
come. The failure of prices to rise more than they did was necessary to
requiring no reserves—a debt of the banks to the government—and of securities
held by the banks—a debt of the government to the banks. (The exemption of
war loan accounts from member bank reserve requirements expired on June 30,
1947, as a result of the Presidential proclamation, issued Dec. 31, 1946, terminat-
ing the period of hostilities of World War II.)
There has been much discussion of the monetary impact of the use of surplus
revenues to retire debt, particularly of the effect of retiring debt held by different
holders. This was a continuation of the wartime confusion assigning special im-
portance to commercial bank-held debt. Other things being the same, retire-
ment of Federal Reserve-held debt through the transfer of Treasury deposits at
commercial banks involved a reduction in high-powered money, and therefore a
contracting influence on the money stock. Retirement of debt held by commercial
banks through the transfer of Treasury deposits at commercial banks requiring
reserves involved initially a reduction of the same amount in deposits requiring
reserves and in bank assets in the form of government securities. Given fractional
reserves, the retirement released excess reserves that would tend to be used to
restore the initial level of deposits and assets, and so it was neutral in its monetary
effects. Retirement of nonbank-held debt with Treasury deposits requiring reserves
involved simply a transfer of ownership of deposits with no direct effects on either
deposits or reserves.
But other things were not the same. Given the support program, both the
amount and distribution of the debt were effectively determined by the holders.
Both had to be whatever was required to make the pattern of rates conform to
the one being supported. For example, if the Treasury used the surplus to retire
long-term securities held by the public, when, at the fixed rates, the public wished
to retain the long terms and dispose of its short terms, the result would be a
tendency of short-term rates to rise and long-term rates to fall. This would lead
in turn to sales of long terms and purchases of short terms by the Federal Reserve
in order to maintain the rate pattern, so leading to precisely the same result as if
the Treasury had initially retired short-term securities. And similarly for any other
pattern of Treasury operations and public preferences. Treasury operations only
determined whether a particular holder acquired his securities from or disposed of
them to the Treasury or the Federal Reserve or other holders.166 WORLD WAR II INFLATION
induce them to do so, while the slow rise in the stock of money reflected
the effect of the excess spending by the public.
Had the federal government not run a surplus, the public, with its ac-
cumulated liquid assets and pent-up demand, would have tried to spend
more in the postwar period than it received—an impossibility, since one
man's expenditures are another's receipts. The process of trying, however,
would have tended to raise prices and incomes and so would have reduced
the level of liquid assets relative to income by this inflationary route.
Moreover, the process would doubtless have tended to raise interest rates
and so would have produced a monetization of the debt and a still larger
rise in prices. As it was, the federal surplus enabled some reduction of
liquid assets relative to income to be achieved without inflation. To put
the matter still differently: in terms of the market for loanable funds, the
Treasury surplus constituted an increase in the supply of loanable funds
and thereby reduced the interest rate that would clear the market at any
given price level, just as the Treasury deficit during the war constituted
an increase in the demand for loanable funds and so tended to raise the
interest rate. The shift in the direction of the Treasury's influence helps
explain why roughly the same level of supported interest rates was below
the level consistent with no change in the money stock during the war,
and above that level after 1946 or 1947.
The Treasury surplus explains how the public could reduce the ratio
of its money and its liquid assets relative to its income, to a limited extent,
without producing either inflationary pressure on prices or monetary ex-
pansion under the support program. It does not explain why the public
sought to reduce the ratios only slightly more than by that limited extent.
It is here that the second factor we believe to be important enters. That
factor was a continued fear of a major contraction and a continued belief
that prices were destined to fall. A rise in prices can have diametrically
opposite effects on desired money balances depending on its effect on
expectations. If it is interpreted as the harbinger of further rises, it raises
the anticipated cost of holding money and leads people to desire lower
balances relative to income than they otherwise would. In our view, that
was the effect of price rises in 1950 and again in 1955 to 1957. On the
other hand, if a rise in prices is interpreted as a temporary rise due to be
reversed, as a harbinger of a likely subsequent decline, it lowers the
anticipated cost of holding money and leads people to desire higher
balances relative to income than they otherwise would. In our view, that
was the effect of the price rises in 1946 to 1948. An important piece of
evidence in support of this view is the behavior of yields on common
stocks by comparison with bond yields. A shift in widely-held expectations
toward a belief that prices are destined to rise more rapidly will tend to
produce a fall in stock yields relative to bond yields because of the hedgeWORLD WAR II INFLATION 167
which stocks provide against inflation. That was precisely what happened
from 1950 to 1951 and again from 1955 to 1957. A shift in widely-held
expectations toward a belief that prices are destined to fall instead of
rise or to fall more sharply will tend to have the opposite effect—which
is precisely what happened from 1946 to 1948.
3
2
Despite the extent to which the public and government officials were
exercised about inflation, the public acted from 1946 to 1948 as if it
expected deflation. There is no real conflict. The major source of concern
about inflation at that time was not the evils of inflation per se—though
no doubt these played a role—but the widespread belief that what goes
up must come down and that the higher the price rise now the larger the
subsequent price fall. In our view, this fear or expectation of a sub-
sequent contraction and price decline reconciled the public to only a
mild reduction in its liquid asset holdings relative to its income and in-
duced it to hold larger real money balances than it otherwise would have
been willing to. In this way, it made the postwar rise more moderate. The
situation at the close of the two world wars was therefore quite different.
The situation after World War II, unlike that after World War I, as
noted, was one of widespread expectation of a price decline.
To avoid misunderstanding: our belief that the most puzzling feature
of experience during the early postwar years is why, given the monetary
3
2 We are indebted to David Meiselman for calling this piece of evidence to our


































I 1955 3.47 4.14 8.25 -0.67 -4.78
IV 1957 5.04 4.46 6.78 0.58 -1.74
SOURCE: Bond and dividend yields are quarterly averages of monthly data; no
seasonal movement was discernible. Earnings yield is earnings per share divided by
a quarterly average of price per share and adjusted for seasonal by us. Data are from
Business Statistics; primary source is Moody's Investors Service.
To make the risk roughly alike as between bonds and stocks, we used Baa bonds.
The use of Aaa bonds would not, however, alter the direction of change in the
yield differences for the three periods. Aaa bond yield minus dividend yield is
—0.96, —3.74; —3.86, -3.24; —1.16, —0.46 (next to the last col.). Aaa bond
yield minus earnings yield is —0.14, —12.36; —13.30, —5.86; —5.27, —2.78
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policies followed, prices and the money stock rose so little does not imply
either approval of those policies or belief that a higher rise in prices and
the money stock would have been desirable. The relatively small rise in
the money stock was not a product of monetary policy designed to achieve
that result but, on the contrary, the policy followed involved surrender of
any possibility of explicitly controlling the money stock. The relatively
small rise was a product primarily of Treasury surpluses and of wide-
spread expectations that a severe price decline was in the offing. Those
expectations were partly a product of the severe 1929-33 contraction,
which fostered a belief that severe contractions were the peacetime danger
if not indeed the norm; and partly a product of the* 1920-21 price
collapse, which fostered a belief that major wars were followed by de-
flation and depression. Of course, had those factors not made the mone-
tary policy actually followed consistent with a small rise in the money
stock, the policy might have been changed, as it was subsequently under
the impact of the Korean War experience.
In retrospect, an even lower rate of increase in prices and the money
stock would have been preferable during 1946 and 1947. A different
monetary policy permitting or forcing a rise in the interest rates on gov-
ernment securities could have contributed to this result, though whether
without an overreaction like that of 1920 is harder to say. Hindsight is
far better than foresight, and the possibility of understanding the course
of events after the fact is no evidence that authorities at the time could
have produced precisely the "right" pattern of changes in the money
stock.
4. The Balance of Payments
World War II, like World War I, was characterized by levels of capital
export (in World War II, including unilateral transfers) unmatched in
any peacetime periods either in absolute magnitude or as percentages of
national income. The pattern of the capital exports is fairly similar in
the two wars (see Chart 51). A very sharp increase from 1914 to 1917
matches an even sharper increase from 1940 to 1944 (these appear as
decreases in the chart, which plots capital inflows and hence shows out-
flows as a negative item). There was then a four-year decline in the
World War I period, a one-year decline in World War II. The extension
of aid in one form or another to the war-devastated countries of the
world after the second war resulted in an increase for two years followed
by a three-year fall to a level around which capital exports fluctuated for
some years thereafter. After World War I, the decline which began in
1918 continued through 1923, with capital exports subsequently varying
around a rather constant level until 1933.
The peak level of capital exports, expressed as a fraction of net nationalWORLD WAR II INFLATION 169
CHART 51
U.S. Net International Capital Movement as a Ratio to National
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NOTE: Capital inflow, minus unilateral transfers, is plotted as plus. Gold outflow is plotted
as plus.
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product, was about the same in World War II as in World War I—8.0
per cent in 1944 compared to 8.2 per cent in 1917—but the period of
abnormally high capital exports was somewhat more prolonged in the
later period, nine years compared to six. The similarity in level of peak
capital exports is surprising in view of the greater war effort involved in
World War II; the difference in the length of the period of abnormally
high capital exports reflects the longer duration of the second war.
After both wars, the new level attained when capital exports had
receded was higher than the prevailing level under earlier peacetime
conditions. From 1907 to 1914, the United States was in approximate
balance, neither importing nor exporting capital; from 1923 to 1932, the
United States exported capital on balance at the rate of about 1 per cent
of net national product; and from 1950 to 1960, at about 2 per cent of
net national product. The source of the shift was, however, different in
the two postwar periods. The higher level of capital exports plus uni-
lateral transfers after the first World War reflected private foreign lend-
ing; the higher level after the second World War reflected government
loans and grants—the British loan, Marshall Plan, and other foreign aid
expenditures, and loans through the Export-Import Bank, the World
Bank, and other similar agencies.
The exchange rate between the dollar and the pound sterling behaved
in one respect quite differently in World War II than it did in World
War I. In World War I, the pound appreciated sharply on the outbreak
of war, only subsequently returning to its prewar parity and being pegged
during the rest of the war at near its prewar parity; in the second war,
the pound depreciated sharply on the outbreak of the war. From the time
Britain left gold in 1931, the pound had no official parity. It first de-
preciated sharply to a monthly low of $3.28 at the end of 1932, then
apreciated to a high of $5.15 in early 1934 after the United States re-
valued gold. From 1934 to mid-1938, the pound fluctuated around a level
slightly below $5.00. Munich and the stepped-up capital outflow from
Europe brought a decline to slightly over $4.60 in August 1939. On the
outbreak of the war, the pound fell precipitously, first, to under $4.00,
then, to as low as $3.27 after the fall of France.
From that point on, the World War I pattern was repeated. Britain
fixed the pound officially at $4,035, imposed exchange controls much
more extensive and detailed than in World War I, and requisitioned
foreign securities and exchange holdings of British nationals. The official
rate was made effective by the autumn of 1940 and maintained there-
after. After lend-lease was enacted in 1941, most of the current pressure
on the pound was removed, just as it was in World War I after the
United States entered the war and assumed responsibility for financing
the dollar purchases of its allies.WORLD WAR II INFLATION 171
Whereas the curve in Chart 51 recording capital exports shows the
same pattern in the two wars, the curve recording relative prices in the
United States and in Britain, adjusted for changes in exchange rates,
does not. In World War I, U.S. prices fell sharply relative to British
prices along with the sharp increase in U.S. capital exports, and the price
ratio rose along with the decrease in capital exports. As we saw in
Chapter 5, the relationship between price movements and capital move-
ments in World War I seemed roughly in line with the relationships dis-
played in the prewar period. In World War II, the price curve in the
figure displays almost the reverse relationship; it rises markedly from
1941 to 1947, with no clear response to rises or falls in capital exports.
What explains this failure of the capital movements to be reflected in
relative prices, as they had been in general throughout the preceding 70
years? One factor which immediately suggests itself is the system of ex-
change controls which Britain adopted in World War II, much more
extensive than that in World War I. However, this factor works in the
wrong direction. As we pointed out in Chapter 5, the effect of foreign
exchange controls was to enable Britain, for any given exchange rate, to
maintain a higher price level at home than she otherwise could or,
alternatively, for given price levels at home and abroad, to maintain a
higher dollar price of the pound sterling than she otherwise could. But
either alternative means that foreign exchange controls would make the
price ratio plotted in Chart 51 lower than otherwise, since this ratio is
adjusted for the exchange rate. Yet the puzzle is why this ratio is so high.
Foreign exchange controls could provide an explanation only if the
United States had imposed such controls to a very much greater extent
than in World War I, but it did not.
The only explanation we can offer is that the abnormal behavior of
the price ratio reflects not exchange controls but internal price controls,
which made the price-index numbers used to compute the ratio seriously
defective as measures of "prices" in some more meaningful sense. Price
control and rationing were far more extensive in Britain than in the
United States, and hence the British index number might be expected





3 In judging the relationship between price and capital movements in Chart 51,
it should be noted that the capital movement figures have had a secular down-
ward trend relative to the price ratio ever since the beginning of the series in
1871. This means that a given level of capital imports into the United States
has tended to be consistent over time with an ever higher price level in the U.S.
relative to Britain; or, alternatively, that a given ratio of prices has been con-
sistent with an ever lower level of capital imports (or higher level of capital ex-
ports). The obvious explanation of this result is a growing comparative advantage
of the United States relative to Britain, a consequence that might be expected to
follow from a more rapid rate of technological growth and capital accumulation
in the U.S. Such a growing comparative advantage was one of the most popular172 WORLD WAR II INFLATION
Some evidence bearing on this explanation is furnished by the com-
parisons with Swiss and Swedish prices plotted in Chart 51. Though
prices were controlled in Switzerland and Sweden to a considerable extent
during the war, the controls were less extensive than those in Britain or
the United States. In addition, both countries were probably subject to
less inflationary pressure. A comparison of U.S. prices with Swiss and
Swedish prices should therefore, if anything, be biased by price control in
the opposite direction from the comparison of U.S. with British prices.
3
4
As we saw in Table 20, British depreciation in 1931 produced a sharp
dispersion in the international structure of prices, largely eliminated by
the 1936 devaluations of the gold-bloc countries. Just before the war,
from 1937 to 1939, the curves for the British, Swedish, and Swiss price
ratios were closer together than they had been since 1930, so those years
provide a fairly uniform starting point. The only other official change in
exchange rates in years close to the war years is the appreciation of the
Swedish krona by about 16 per cent in the summer of 1946, which ac-
counts for the decline in the Swedish curve in that year.
explanations adduced for the alleged "dollar shortage" after the war (see John R.
Hicks, "An Inaugural Lecture," Oxford Economic Papers, June 1953, pp. 121—
135).
M A recent study of Swedish experience during World War II provides Swedish
monetary and price data for a comparison with wartime changes in similar U.S.
data.
Percentage change, II 1939-11 1945, in:
1. Currency plus adjusted demand deposits
2. Money stock (item 1, plus time deposits
in commercial banks)
3. Consumer price index
4. Wholesale price index
The much smaller rise in Swedish than in U.S. monetary magnitudes suggests
lesser inflationary pressure in Sweden, though, for two reasons, it is not decisive
evidence. (1) The wartime disruptions of trade probably had a more serious
effect on the productive potential of Sweden than of the United States. (2)
Sweden had a smaller fraction of its productive potential unemployed in 1939
than did the United States.
The much larger rise in Swedish than U.S. price index numbers, despite the
smaller rise in monetary magnitudes, seems reasonably clear evidence of a lesser
suppression of price rises by price control. However, from the third quarter of
1942 to the second quarter of 1945, a period in which price controls tightened,
there was no rise in Swedish prices, yet monetary totals rose a further 30 per cent.
Perhaps that is why the discrepancy between the price ratios of U.S. against
British and Swedish prices narrows after 1942, whereas the discrepancy between
the price ratios of U.S. against British and Swiss prices continues to widen to
1945.
For Swedish figures, see Daniel J. Edwards, "Process of Economic Adaptation
in a World War II-Neutral Country: A Case Study of Sweden," unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 1961, pp. 144-145, 163-164. We are
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For the war years proper, the Swiss and Swedish comparisons both
yield results to be expected from the earlier relationships between capital
movements and unilateral transfers, on the one hand, and relative prices,
on the other. U.S. prices fell relative to prices in both countries from
1939 to 1941, rose from then to 1950 for Swedish prices, to 1951 for
Swiss prices. The initial fall roughly coincides with a period when U.S.
capital exports and transfers were increasing, and the subsequent rise
with a period of generally declining U.S. capital exports and transfers.
Moreover, the magnitude of the fall and of the rise in U.S. purchasing-
power parity bore roughly the same relation to the magnitude of the




5 Disruptions of transportation and financial arrangements were so great during
World War II that it may seem pointless to seek to find a continuation of peace-
time relations between capital movements and relative prices. And, of course, it is
not impossible that these relations might be so thoroughly distorted by the war-
time effects as to alter fundamentally the peacetime relations. However, our ex-
perience in World War I, when the relationships were little affected, should
give pause.
Wartime or peacetime, any discrepancy between the amount of foreign cur-
rency Americans want to acquire to spend or invest or give away or hold and
the amount non-Americans want to give up to acquire dollars for corresponding
purposes will have to be eliminated, since ex post the sums acquired and disposed
of are" equal. The differences between wartime and peacetime are two: (1) the
amounts that the parties desire to acquire or dispose of are altered (demand and
supply curves for foreign exchange are shifted); (2) direct controls are used
much more extensively to eliminate ex ante discrepancies. Regarding (1), it is
not clear what the net effect of the shifts is. One might expect that for neutral
nations both demand for and supply of foreign exchange would have been re-
duced by the increased hazards of trade (which, as it were, increased the average
price of imports and simultaneously reduced the average proceeds from exports).
Regarding (2), if the exchange rates prevailing could be maintained without
extensive controls, it must have been because relative prices adjusted for ex-
change rates were not far out of line with those required to maintain equilibrium.
What was the mechanism that maintained the relationship between relative
prices and capital outflows? Part of the answer may be that during World War
II capital outflows adjusted to relative prices to a greater extent than they had
during peacetime. Suppose, for example, citizens of a neutral country were tend-
ing to accumulate dollar balances. In peacetime, the attempt to dispose of these
actual or potential balances would set in motion forces bringing relative prices,
adjusted for exchange rates, into line with desired capital movements. In wartime,
this attempt may have been short-circuited, partly because neutrals might have
been willing to hold more dollar balances, just as U.S. citizens were, in anticipa-
tion of being able to acquire, after the war, goods currently unavailable; partly
because foreign-exchange controls by either the neutral nation or the U.S. might
freeze the balances temporarily. In either case, the accumulation of dollar bal-
ances, whether desired or undesired, would constitute a capital inflow offsetting
the autonomous U.S. capital outflows to its allies. But insofar as that occurred,
it meant the capital outflow was adjusting to relative prices, since high relative
prices in the U.S. would tend toward a large offsetting capital inflow, low relative
prices, toward a small offsetting inflow.
But this is only part of the story. As neutrals accumulated dollar balances in
excess of desired amounts, they sought to acquire local currency, and government
agencies fixing exchange rates were required to provide them with such currency,174 WORLD WAR II INFLATION
These comparisons with Swiss and Swedish prices therefore offer some
support for the hypothesis that internal price controls and consequent
defects in price index numbers account for the failure of the British price
ratio to show the same relation to price movements during and after
World War II as it had earlier.
3
6
thus producing the kinds of effects internally that gold flows would have pro-
duced. The mechanism was essentially the same as that during peacetime.
Finally, changes in exchange rates were always waiting in the wings if needed.
As already noted, insofar as they were not needed, it meant that the prior ad-
justment mechanisms were adequate.
3
6 A more decisive test of this hypothesis would require computation of the
Swiss and Swedish price ratios for a longer period, and an examination for the
earlier periods of the quantitative relation between movements in capital and in
such alternative price ratios.PUP U.S. ONLY ECONOMICS/HISTORY
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